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Introduction 
The purpose of this exegesis is to describe the theoretical, biographical, and practical journey 
of producing the text of the book, The Challenge of Existential Social Work Practice. The 
exegesis is Part A of the complete thesis, and Part B is the book itself, which is not submitted 
as a separate document, as it is subject to commercial contract with the publishers, Palgrave 
Macmillan. Part C is an article titled ‘Applying Gabriel Marcel’s Thought in Social Work 
Practice’, which was published in Marcel Studies in 2015 and is freely available on line. The 
three documents comprise my attempt to make sense of an existential approach to social work 
practice in the 21st century.  
In this exegesis, I critically examine the writings of key existential thinkers such as Jean 
Paul Sartre, Gabriel Marcel, and Martin Heidegger as they apply to social work. The view 
that existential thought is incommensurable with the diversity of existential perspectives is 
rejected. There are some fundamental concepts shared among existential thinkers. Two 
examples are the ideas of being-in-the-world and lived experience, which, I argue, are 
common to all the thinkers mentioned above.  
My focus is the application of existential thinking to social work practice. The corpus 
of existential creative writing, which includes literature, plays, films, and diaries, features less 
in my work than does explicitly philosophical writing. My view is that the philosophical 
works are most relevant to social work practice. However, existential creative writing does 
highlight important features of existential thought in a way that enhances our understanding 
of the underlying philosophy. Albert Camus, for example, wrote more creative works than 
philosophical ones, and as such this exploration of existential thought must cover a broad 
cross-section of existential writing limited by my focus on social work. For example, I refer 
to ‘The Guest’ (1958), a short story by Camus. I have used this short story because I believe 
that it brings out the dilemma of the helping person in a hostile environment in their role as 
both a social control and potential agent of social change. For me, Camus’s story exemplifies 
the challenge of being in both roles, taking both responsibilities seriously and facing the 
challenges of this dilemma.  
‘The Guest’ is about a French school teacher who also provides a basic welfare service 
to the local Arab community during the Algerian revolution. Social work frequently operates 
within conflict situations where competing sides are causing harm, and it attempts to provide 
a humane solution. Like the school teacher in this fictional story, the concrete situation of the 
social worker requires that the he or she balance their social control functions with their 
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attempts to find a humane solution that is faithful to his or her social justice objectives. My 
perspective on this existential social work practice can only be personal, and does not claim 
to be objective. Nor can it be my final word; I am on a journey of discovery that continues to 
challenge and change my perspective, even as I write these words. As a social work 
practitioner, I must create my personal response in the moment of practice.  
Later, I examine some of the key influential secondary sources on existential thought, 
writings by Hazel Barnes (1959), Walter Kaufmann (1972), James D. Collins (1954), 
William Barrett (1961) and Kevin Aho (2014). These writers, among others, provide useful 
introductory texts on the topic of existentialism. They have all written extensively on the 
topic, and have helped promote and shape people’s understanding of it. I have chosen these 
writers because they express a very diverse range of views. Their writings cover the last 
sixty-five years, beginning with James Collins’ The Existentialists, published in 1952, and 
finishing with Kevin Aho’s introductory text Existentialism (2014). 
There is also a significant body of work on existential therapy, but its application to 
social work practice in general has rarely been explored (Shapiro, 2016). While I do not 
practice existential therapy, I have studied its main approaches and how they can apply to 
social work practice. My book aims to address the distinction between existential therapy as a 
clinical practice and existential social work practice; the latter of which, in direct practice, 
aims for a broader range of interventions than does therapy. I also apply an existential social 
work practice framework to social policy, leadership and team work, to social movements, 
program reviews, evidence-based practice and social group work. Social work encompasses a 
range of methods and roles, and an existential social work approach needs to address all these 
aspects.  
There is also a considerable literature on existential social work practice. There are 
writers who identify with the existential label, such as Neil Thompson (1992), Donald Krill 
(1978), and Jim Lantz and Joseph Walsh (2007). Other works that I examine have not been 
labelled “existential”. However, I am certainly not the first writer to have applied this label to 
the Otto Rank-inspired, Functional School of social work practice. There is also a range of 
lesser known social work writers – such as Ruth Wilkes (1981) – who have been influenced 
by existential and phenomenological thought. Much of this material exists in early social 
work journal articles, some of which are not available on current electronic databases (Taft 
1928).  
While I cannot claim to have made a complete analysis of all existential social work 
writing in my book, I have covered the key texts and articles on the subject. Many of these 
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existential social work authors have also written articles on other topics. Where relevant, I 
have also reviewed these writings, including Neil Thompson’s (2006) anti-discriminatory 
practice theory, which is informed by Sartre’s critical social existential theories, and Jim 
Lantz’s (2000) cognitive, family and short-term therapy work, which is informed by Viktor 
Frankl’s (2004) logotherapy. I also examine other existential writers, such as Gabriel Marcel 
(1966).  
Finally, although I focus on theory in this exegesis, I have not excluded practice issues 
or examples from the discussion where these might help clarify a point. This exegesis 
contains a chapter-by-chapter elaboration and interpretation of the texts that inform my book.  
I will also address aspects of my biography as a social worker in the exegesis to 
illuminate my practice, theoretical preferences and viewpoint. The writing of the exegesis has 
informed my book. My current work in the family violence field and in facilitating men’s 
behaviour change programs shapes some of my preferences. For example, my need to 
critically engage with the work of Alan Jenkins (2009), which is aligned with narrative 
therapy, reflects my current employment in family violence work. It also requires me to 
examine theoretical perspectives, such as narrative therapy, that I regard as compatible with 
existential theory (Richert, 2010). 
I also bring my personal and political values, preferences and biases to my professional 
life. My preference for an existential approach to social work is shaped by it being a “way of 
life” philosophy, a practical moral perspective on how to live a fulfilling life. I combine this 
with other viewpoints which I find useful; for example, cognitive developmental and 
functional theory, and some postmodern social construction theories, such as narrative 
therapy. In this respect, I have done what other existential writers have been doing since the 
first explicit uses of existential thought: combining it with other compatible theoretical 
viewpoints.  
In this context, it is important to emphasize that I am not arguing for the superiority of 
the existential perspective over other views, nor claiming that it has some monopoly on 
wisdom. Rather, I argue that the existential view has been marginalized within social work by 
more dominant theories, such as eco-systems thinking, critical theory and psychodynamic 
perspectives. One of the challenges is discovering how existential thought can bring insight 
into and enhance other complementary theoretical views. I have already mentioned the work 
of Alan Jenkins (2001; 2009), in which he has written from a narrative, feminist perspective, 
and also using restorative justice practices, about how to work effectively with violent or 
abusive (including sexually abusive) men. Jenkins’ work has been influential over the past 
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two decades among facilitators of men’s behaviour change programs in Australia. Jenkins 
draws our attention to a risk that workers may select passages of his practice suggestions and 
apply them without a deep understanding of his overall framework, and this may lead to the 
inappropriate use of his questions and phrases. Eclectic borrowing of ideas from a range of 
approaches runs the risk of being what might be described as shallow direct practice. Good 
practice emerges when practitioners integrate theory and practice, and apply it appropriately. 
Consequently, part of my journey in writing this work has been my engagement with Jenkins’ 
thought, as well as with that of other writers who have already integrated existential and 
narrative approaches, such as Richert (2010).  
Existential theory can engage with a range of other theoretical appeoaches, such as 
solution therapy, cognitive theory, psychoanalytic theory and systems theory, and it remains 
very popular. Aho (2014) documents existentialism’s relevance to today’s issues through its 
contribution to critical and race theories and various other theories of oppression, as well as 
its critique of all-pervasive technology and its impact on the environment. He also considers 
its links to Buddhist thought in dealing with chronic suffering, and its application in health 
and therapy through the popular phenomenological research approach to peoples’ 
experiences, and through the world-wide existential therapy movement.  
These are just some of the theory’s current applications. I can see a danger that 
existential thought could be regarded as some kind of panacea for every problem facing 
social work. I am not claiming this. Rather, I am noting that existential thought continues to 
be vibrant after a significant amount of time. Perhaps this is partly due to its emphasis on 
concrete, worldly issues, and on the concept of lived experience, which has become very 
popular in the social sciences.  
Social work has a long history of engagement with existential ideas. My book aims to 
explore some of this history, which has not been well documented in any one publication to 
date. This exegesis documents the ways in which my perspective on existential social work 
practice builds upon previous efforts by writers, such as Krill (1978) and Thompson (1992), 
as well as where it differs. Part of this process of engaging with previous existentially-
informed social work writers involves addressing my own background in existential thought.   
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My involvement in existential thought: Why existentialism?  
I first came across existentialist thought when taking a course on continental European 
philosophy taught by Dr Max Charlesworth at Melbourne University. The set text was 
Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, by Walter Kaufmann (1972). I took the course in 
1975, five years before Sartre’s death. We first examined Sartre’s famous public lecture of 
1946, Existentialism is a Humanism, (Sartre, 2007) in tutorials, and I was aware at the time 
that Sartre had embraced Marxism and was aligned to the Maoists in France. I remember the 
crucial question in this essay was Sartre’s embrace of the Kantian categorical imperative that 
‘in committing myself, one also commits the whole of humanity’ (Sartre, cited in Kaufmann, 
1972, p. 305). For this view, he was criticized, both by his contemporaries, and in our 
tutorials, because it appeared to be a regression to a derivative ethical position from Kant and 
not a genuinely new philosophy. This move by Sartre perplexed me at the time. In retrospect, 
Sartre was making an impromptu public speech at the height of his fame and popularity. He 
was aware of a serious flaw in existentialism’s popular advocacy of freedom as the highest 
value. How do you deal with the rationalist egoist who chooses to use his freedom for self-
interest, self-aggrandizement, or other selfish purposes? Sartre had returned to Kant to 
address this flaw. Sartre’s position cannot be dismissed as a mere off-the-cuff comment; 
Sartre published this speech, even though he later expressed regret at doing so. His regret 
probably derives from the ease with which his adversaries on the left were able to dismiss his 
“new” philosophy as Kantian and idealist.  
As a young student, I remember being fascinated (and a little overwhelmed) by the 
complexity of philosophy and by the obviously greater expertise of some of my fellow 
students. One student introduced me to the Marxist-Leninist canon as interpreted through 
Maoist ideology. It seemed to offer a ready-made way through the mystification of so much 
philosophy. Doing a philosophy major also means studying philosophers, like George 
Berkeley and his analytical philosophy, and Marxism provided a radical tool to understand 
and critique this thought. It was like finding a new belief system or religion that explains 
everything. It wasn’t a big step to embrace Sartre, given his seeming adherence to similar 
positions. Besides having a sharp political mind, Sartre always seemed to be on the side of 
the underdog in world affairs and that was a philosophy that suited me. I now view Maoism 
as a form of negative rebellion, as Bill Moyer describes it in his book Doing Democracy 
(2001). Moyer’s book was very influencial on me in trying to make sense of social 
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movements in social work and of the need to adhere to democratic, non-violent approaches in 
achieving sustainable social change.  
I remained interested in Marxist thought through Sartre’s work, although I found that 
his obscure, verbose writing made it difficult to understand. Sartre’s literary estate, through 
his publishers, continued to release works in English translation after Sartre’s death, so it 
seemed to me as though Sartre was still alive, even throughout the 1990s. I gradually lost 
interest in Marxism, and with its demise in my life Sartre appeared passé. But I still found 
something in his writing that kept me interested, an interest that was reignited many years 
later when I discovered that Neil Thompson (1992) had applied Sartre’s thought to social 
work practice.  
Social work itself brought me into contact with other academics influenced by 
existential thought, such as Dr Peter O’Connor, a social worker and writer with a private 
psychotherapy practice, who had been influenced by the writings of Carl Jung and Søren 
Kierkegaard. Anything existential had always attracted my attention, but the obscurity of 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy, with its obsession with Christianity, was of little interest to me. 
Partly, I was still rejecting overtly Christian thinkers at this stage, due to my very negative 
experiences with Christianity growing up. I now view my early rejection of Kierkegaard as 
shallow.  
What was interesting about O’Connor was seeing an obviously deep thinking therapist 
use philosophy in a therapeutic way. O’Connor had read these thinkers thoroughly and had 
absorbed their ideas. In his lectures, O’Connor combined Kierkegaard’s overarching 
philosophy with very pragmatic techniques taken from a range of other sources to create his 
unique approach to therapy. At this stage, I was not attracted to any sort of private practice 
social work as was advocated by the emphasis on counselling in my social work course.  
My social work career led me into the public welfare areas of child protection, youth 
justice, and community health, and eventually into management of small non-government 
agencies delivering services to statutory clients, usually on a voluntary basis. There was a 
palpable tension between the roles of social control agent and advocate for social justice for 
highly marginalized young people. I had previously experienced student placements in 
hospitals and mental health settings, where I had enjoyed the work but had disliked the 
dominance of the medical model.  
Public welfare seemed to provide social workers with more freedom to make a 
difference in people’s lives. This is an area where social control looms large, where harmful 
behaviours and evil and good actions are everyday concerns, and where engagement is the 
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real challenge. Existentialism appeared to take a back seat to other theories, like functional 
theory, in working out how to improve a marginalized family’s coping skills through, for 
example, writing a family functioning profile and identifying services that could be 
improved. A family with child protection issues that received financial counselling assistance 
could improve in other areas through this systematic process of assessment and intervention.  
Over time, I became more interested in working with hard to reach adolescents, and 
developmental theory provided the tools to determine maturity levels and to respond 
appropriately to the corresponding level of understanding and characteristic ways of dealing 
with the world. For example, a peer-orientated young person who ignored adult 
communication needed a completely different engagement strategy from a young person who 
had developed some individual ethical standards. Somehow, I stumbled across a draft chapter 
of James Barber’s Beyond Casework, which would eventually be published in 1991. In this 
book, Barber presented a conflict management approach to working with involuntary clients 
which placed the emphasis on creating an expanded negotiable territory with the client. This 
was accomplished by being succinct about the non-negotiable aspects of your involvement 
with the client (Barber, 1991, pp. 42–60). Other writers (Trotter, 2015; Ivanoff, Blythe and 
Tripodi, 1994) have subsequently addressed the matter of involuntary or statutory work, but 
at the time, it was Barber’s work that had a powerful impact on my daily practice. 
I began as project co-ordinator of the first restorative justice group conferencing pilot 
project in Victoria in 1995, and I remained involved in this work for over ten years. In 
retrospect, this experience taught me the importance of social work in a social movement in 
creating new services for and approaches to old problems, like youth crime. At the time, I had 
not connected my professional work to existential thought, as restorative justice seemed more 
connected to family theory, empowerment theory, and group work processes. I was studying 
family therapy at the Bouverie Clinic to fill a gap in my knowledge of how to intervene 
successfully with families. But the existential themes are there in restorative justice processes 
in the ideas of taking responsibility, allowing the client to creatively decide (with the help of 
their support group) on their own plan to make amends, and in using story-telling and making 
personal statements about the lived experience of the impact of an offence.  
There was always a spiritual element in how I facilitated group conferences to assist in 
conflict resolution. I worked hard to bring a spiritual energy to the room, through extensive 
preparation of all participants and the creation of a peaceful environment. Firstly, effort went 
into making the sessions safe forums. Much of the work you do in a pilot project in on 
“firsts”. There is an anonymized illustration of this process in the third chapter of the book. I 
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remember channelling spiritual energy into that room long before the participants, still 
traumatized by events, attended the conference. On another occasion, I was required to 
facilitate a group conference in front of a government minister and his entourage. You need 
to truly believe in a program to confidently perform under such circumstances. It took ten 
years from the first conference in 1995 for a legislated, state-wide program to be 
implemented. This process is described in the book’s fifth chapter. I also started practicing 
yoga, and reconnected with the contemplative elements of Christianity – it was the work of 
Buddhist writers like Thích Nhất Hạnh (1997) that encouraged me to explore the positive 
roots of Christianity. I also completed a Masters of Social Work on ‘Teaching Yoga in 
Addiction Recovery’ (2007), also under the supervision of Professor Bob Pease.  
I became aware of existential social work thought when I began this PhD, while 
teaching social housing workers and social workers at a higher education level. This was 
primarily through Neil Thompson’s (1992) existential anti-discriminatory practice approach, 
which was informed by his study of Sartre’s attempt to reinvigorate Marxism through 
existential thought. From a teaching perspective, students seemed to grasp Thompson’s 
(2006) person, cultural and structural (PCS) model (see Figure 1, below), and they quickly 
applied it in their own work.  
I would ask the students to imagine every person they work with as having Thompson’s 
three elements or dimensions to their existence. Thompson linked his model directly to 
Sartre’s existential philosophy, in which the social worker can challenge and externalize 
discourses that are oppressive and help the person to find new approaches that give them a 
sense of freedom and responsibility. I was hoping that the students would understand that the 
client in front of them (and the other people around them) had these structural and cultural 
oppressions, in addition to the personal oppressions that were more readily apparent. 
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Figure 1. Thompson’s (1992) Anti-discriminatory Practice Model 
 
 
Research Process 
The research process for this PhD may be organised and discussed under a number of 
different qualitative methodologies; These are,  
• biographical data, as described in the previous section on my historical engagement 
with existential thought and as described in my history as a social worker in some of 
the examples used in the text, The Challenge of Existential Social Work Practice. 
Biographical material as a research approach is also documented in how I immersed 
myself into existential thought opportunities that were available to me over the last 
four years of this research, which are described immediately after this paragraph.   
• Secondary data analysis, including analysis and comment on existing existential 
writing in social work, re-examination of practice examples and case studies from the 
published literature, such as the discussions of RD Laing’s work in Chapter 4 of the 
book,  
• Reflective practice, particularly making use of Marcel’s concept of primary and 
secondary reflection, with the latter referring to a deeper level of reflection that 
involves the person taking responsibility for their involvement in whatever is being 
reflected on and it’s meaning for them (Marcel, 1987). My reflective practice is also 
Person
Cultural 
Structural 
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informed by social work approaches to critical reflection and practitioner research 
(Fook, Gardner, 2013, Fuller, Petch 1995).   
• Focus Groups, as described in the next section of this Exegesis.
During the PhD, I immersed myself in existential thought. I have become familiar with the 
existential therapy movement in Australia by attending a number of professional workshops 
organized by the Australia-based Centre for Existential Practice. The centre is primarily 
aligned with the phenomenologically informed work of Ernesto Spinelli (2007) and the 
philosophically informed existential therapy of Emmy van Deurzen (2010). I have also 
attended two conferences, one in Melbourne and one in Sydney, facilitated by Professor Mick 
Cooper, a leading academic writer on existential therapy in all its current forms.  
In August 2013, I attended the Kierkegaard in the World Conference at the Australian 
Catholic University. There were leading global scholars of Kierkegaard attending this 
conference, including C. Stephen Evans, John Lippitt, Charles Guignon, and Daphne 
Hampson. I learned from this conference that there are many different interpretations of 
Kierkegaard’s thought. Various speakers approached his work from established perspectives, 
including the orthodox Christian, existential, feminism-informed, postmodern, and critical.  
I became involved in three weekly reading groups, struggling through complex 
existential phenomenological texts such as Heidegger’s Being and Time (1962), Merleau-
Ponty’s The Phenomenology of Perception (1962), and Hegel’s Science of Logic (2009). In 
each of these reading groups, members (all PhD students of various disciplines) would read 
an agreed upon chapter or so, and then hold a discussion on the issues raised. I found this 
process helpful in getting through these texts.  
In addition, I have attended numerous philosophy courses on Hegel, Camus, Sartre and 
Heidegger organized by the Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy, including courses 
by leading academics, such as Mark Wrathall, on ‘The Late Heidegger’, and two courses on 
Sartre’s existential biographies and his Critique of Dialectical Reasoning, Volume 1, as well 
as a course on Sartre and Lacan, and another on Camus.  
As part of the reading group on Hegel’s Science of Logic, I helped organize the 2014 
summer school on Hegel and social movements at the Wheeler Centre in Melbourne. I 
mention this as an example of the phenomenon that it is often the inadvertent discoveries in 
the course of your work that seem to reap the rewards. Organizing this summer school 
involved contacting and becoming familiar with leading overseas academics specialising in 
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Hegel and his philosophy. My email contact with Robert Wallace (2005) began here, and 
reading his work on Hegel has shaped my thinking.  
It was during this period that I discovered what Wallace describes as Hegel’s greatest 
discovery, his concept of true infinity, as distinct from spurious infinity. True infinity 
encompasses the finite; spurious infinity proposes an infinite being that is separate from the 
finite world – this is comparable to the traditional view of God as an infinite being, 
completely separate from the finite world of matter. Hegel developed his concept of true 
infinity from his reading of the Gospels and of the revelation contained within the incarnation 
of Christ. For Hegel, the truly infinite must encompass the finite by definition. I was 
discovering this world of Hegel while surrounded by critical thinkers who had been inspired 
by Marx’s reading of Hegel, which explicitly rejects these theological views. Wallace is not a 
theologian but rather a philosopher open to spirit, and he approaches Hegel from this 
perspective.  
The Hegel reading group was organized by a very friendly and inviting Marxist named 
Andy Blunden. The Hegelian philosophical world seems to be divided into two camps, the 
Marxist and the theological, and these operate completely independently of each other. I 
discovered that Blunden was known among members of the theological camp and was 
respected by writers like Robert Wallace. He had a deep understanding of Hegel’s work and 
its role in social movements. He made the point that Hegel’s view on the state was akin to our 
modern conception of a social movement. For Hegel, the state was really about people 
coming together to sort out social issues collectively. Society itself was something like a 
social movement, inspired by ideas that drove their new consciousness of the need for 
change. I understand when Hegel speaks about ideas shaping our world and changing things. 
Social movements are created by people and fought for by people. The ideas or concepts that 
shape these movements and our world need social workers to work alongside others to 
progress them.  
Sartre, Hegel, and other critical theorists like Habermas (1981), in his theory of 
communicative action, have made a significant contribution to social existential thought in 
their study of the role of group processes and social movements in social change. My 
exchanges with Robert Wallace and Andy Blunden broadened my understanding of social 
movements to include self-help groups like the Twelve-step programs, which aim to change 
people’s consciousness in order to address addictive behaviours. I had previously attended 
numerous Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous meetings as an observer, 
because they were inspiring and because they had many parallels with restorative justice 
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conferences in their narrative style of problem solving. Working in family violence also made 
me very conscious of how social movements shape and have shaped service delivery.  
In recent times, it has been the emergence of an existentially inspired view of Jesus’ 
original teachings that has most piqued my interest. The “existential Jesus” has been divested 
of the Christian churches’ dogmas. This is the Jesus that rejected dogmas, traditions and 
beliefs in favour of living fully within being or current reality. In doing a course on his early 
Christian writings, I discovered that Hegel (1948), as early as 1796, had already understood 
much of what had only recently been written about the so-called existential Jesus. He also 
understood that Christ needed the church, first as a social movement and later as an 
institution, in order for his teachings to spread.  
Today, Christ’s thought cannot be separated from the institutional history that followed 
his life. This was a revelation to me, and sent me back to discovering the roots of modern 
existentialism in Hegel through modern philosophers – such as Robert Solomon (1987) – 
who were openly existential thinkers, and embraced Hegel as an existential thinker, too. I 
began discovering existentialists in unusual places. For example, Gerald Corey (2013) took 
up an existential viewpoint as a meta-theory while writing numerous standard textbooks on 
counselling in America, which reviewed all the therapeutic approaches. As was and is the 
case for many theorists and practitioners, existentialism and existential therapy provided his 
meta-theory.  
Perhaps the book that has most influenced my approach is one I stumbled upon, Human 
Existence and Theodicy (1992), by Robert Sutton, which compares Christ’s parables with the 
work of Camus. In this book, Sutton draws together these two thinkers to address the problem 
of evil, or human suffering created by natural or human causes; similarly, much of social 
work is deals with addressing the consequences of human suffering and the behaviour that 
causes it. What Sutton finds is that both men adopted a very pragmatic approach and had a 
willingness to accept that, given life’s vicissitudes, the only response that makes sense is one 
of compassion for others and of living life to the fullest through love for and mercy to 
yourself and others. I found it curious that Sutton should quote his teacher Kessler as stating 
that finite beings can affirm that ‘life is not ultimately precarious’ (Sutton, 1992, p. xii). What 
does this mean? Was this some reversion to a notion of an afterlife?  
I began a very fruitful conversation by email with the author who was pleased that his 
book had caught my interest. Through that conversation, I came to think what Kessler’s 
comment means is that we can potentially live our lives not driven by anxiety and fear if we 
have hope that we live in a world that is supporting our efforts to do good and make a 
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difference. Despite all the horrors, these thinkers believed that our world did have this 
capacity, and that living ethically involves putting yourself in synch with its abundance. I 
find, at this deeper level, that the diversity of existential thought coalesces around this notion: 
Heidegger’s being, True Infinity for Hegel, and love and mercy for Camus and Christ.  
The theoretical work wasn’t just contained in a world of ideas. It helped me make sense 
of all my social work experience which had been informed, for many years, by spiritual 
practices such as meditation and yoga. Without any intention on my part, I gradually came to 
question those early, atheistic versions of existential thought that assumed, a priori, that only 
the finite material world exists. This is how I came to read existential thinkers like Gabriel 
Marcel, of whom I knew nothing before I began this thesis.  
Focus groups 
I obtained ethics approval to facilitate four focus groups, using digital technology to bring 
together experienced social workers who had expressed an interest in existentially-informed 
social work practice. The recruitment for the focus groups was conducted through the 
Australian Association of Social Workers (AASW), which regularly inform its membership 
of research opportunities, and from my attendance at the Congress for Existential Therapy in 
2015 (see Appendix Two for a copy of the AASW advertisement). The focus group ethics 
approval process went through Deakin University’s human research approval process, and 
also had to be cleared by the AASW research ethics approval process.  
The focus group attracted five social worker participants, from the Northern Territory, 
Queensland, and New South Wales. All of the social workers were very experienced 
practitioners, aged between 40 and 60, and all except one was then working in a private 
practice setting. The exception was an agency-based social worker in disability support. 
Private practitioners are most likely to desire collegiate involvement, given their relatively 
isolated work compared to social workers in publicly funded agencies. All of the participants 
had significant interest in existentialism and had a knowledge of, and some practice 
experience in, existential therapy. I met one of the participants at the London conference. She 
had begun work as an existential therapist before completing a social work degree.  
Private practice social work in Australia is supported by a publicly-funded health 
system that provides substantial payments to patients for approved professions to provide 
psychological counselling for designated conditions under a GP-written and -referred mental 
health plan. This means that the patient first goes to their doctor, who fills out a mental health 
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plan report that involves a twenty minute medical consultation. The patient is referred by the 
doctor to a focused psychological treatment of up to six separate hourly sessions before a 
medical review and a further four sessions can be approved, bringing the total to ten sessions 
per year. Medicare reimburses a set amount of the cost of these ten sessions, but there can be 
a shortfall which must be paid by the patient. Some practices bulk bill patients, which means 
there are no out of pocket expenses and only the scheduled fee is charged.  
This public funding of approved private counselling practitioners means that many 
people who could not otherwise afford counselling are able to receive it. Social workers, who 
are required to be AASW members to have appropriate experience in counselling, and to 
have completed additional training in evidence-based, cognitive behavioural therapy, are 
approved by the AASW to be mental health plan-accredited social workers and can thus 
provide these services.  
The social worker participant from the Northern Territory had significant practice 
experience with Aboriginal clients from marginalized backgrounds. She felt an existential 
approach to social work was consistent with indigenous approaches to the world, especially 
in terms of the shared emphasis on meaning and being-in-the-world. She had read Donald 
Krill’s work since his earliest articles in the 1970s and had applied them in her own unique 
version of existential social work practice.  
The existential therapist-turned-social worker whom I had met at the London 
conference had felt very frustrated in social work training before she came across Neil 
Thompson’s work, which really helped her connect her existential therapy training to an 
existentially informed social work practice. The two other social workers were private 
practitioners in mental health, one with a specialization in military veterans, and the other 
with a general practice. They both expressed a keen interest in the existential approach to 
social work practice.  
The sessions were held in video-conferencing rooms at Deakin University using various 
online technologies. People were connected by Deakin IT staff through conference calls and 
other online systems such as Skype. I would email my PowerPoint presentations to the 
participants before each session. At the start of each session, I would make a 20 minute 
presentation on the topic of the day before opening the sessions up for general discussion and 
allowing time for at least one of the participants to present a case study, based on their own 
experiences but anonymized. I assisted some of the participants to disguise their case 
materials between sessions. I recorded the audio of the sessions, and the case studies were 
documented. Three of these cases will appear in the soon-to-be-published book. Before 
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inclusion in the manuscript, I further disguised the case examples and sent them to the 
participants for approval. This led to further additional changes aimed at ensuring anonymity. 
The cases from my own practice were similarly disguised.  
These processes are consistent with the requirements of the human ethics approval 
process. The participants were also asked how they would like to be acknowledged for their 
contribution to the research in the book’s preface. This acknowledgement was not linked to 
any of the case examples, thus ensuring anonymity, even in situations in which certain clients 
wanted their cases identified. The cases were all discussed during the focus groups. This 
discussion was very positive for me and for all the participants, and allowed for feedback to 
be given on the work done with clients, as well as for reflective practice discussion on things 
learning from the casework.  
I organized the four two-hour focus group sessions around topics drawn from my 
reading and from the process of writing the book:  
• Session 1: What do we mean by existential social work? 
• Session 2: The history of existential thinking in social work (covering Ruth Wilkes, 
David Weiss, Donald Krill, Neil Thompson, Jim Lantz, and Howard Goldstein) 
• Session 3: The challenges of existential social work practice (covering existential 
approaches to assessment and intervention, R. D. Laing, and Irving Yalom and his group 
work approach to these matters)  
• Session 4: The evidence base for existential social work (covering the final topics of the 
book, as follows: using creativity in existential social work; existential social policy and 
social movements, and; bringing it all together)  
 
The benefits in facilitating the focus group for me were that it helped me to clarify the 
difference between existential social work and existential therapy. I also obtained some very 
useful case studies that expanded the range of case material used in the book. I had a 
sympathetic audience with whom to explore my views on existential social work practice. It 
also gave me some insights into how social workers come to have an existential perspective 
in their practice. A bonus was that it helped me to make a link between existential theory and 
indigenous perspectives, which includes the importance of a spiritual dimension.  
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Marcel and social work  
During my PhD candidature, I wrote an article titled, ‘Applying Gabriel Marcel’s Thought in 
Social Work Practice’, which appeared in the inaugural volume of a peer reviewed online 
American philosophical journal titled Marcel Studies (Griffiths, 2016). Completing this 
article required me to gain a comprehensive grasp of all of Marcel’s work and its previous 
application in social work practice, mainly through the writing of American social worker 
and family therapist Jim Lantz. Nobody had previously identified Marcel’s work during the 
First World War as military social work, but that is what he was doing, reuniting missing 
soldiers with their families. Marcel’s social work experience had a profound impact on his 
philosophy, which shifted from idealism to a concrete existentialism. The overwhelming 
number of referrals and the immense human needs that he was dealing with have parallels to 
the current state of public welfare social work practice, particularly in terms of demand. 
Marcel’s emphasis on our presence and availability over functional approaches (that treat 
people only as a number or claimant) seemed to me to be worth writing about. Marcel is 
widely identified as the first modern philosopher to use the term “existentialism”, but he is far 
less well known for it (Joseph and Reynolds, 2011, p. 15). 
I found it interesting that Marcel’s military social work experience played such a 
defining role in his mature philosophy of concrete existentialism. The use made by social 
worker Jim Lantz of Marcel’s philosophy in his family therapy and social work practice gave 
me confidence to write of my own experiences in applying Marcel’s concepts to social work. 
During this period, I made contact with Felicity Joseph, the only Australian philosopher who 
had written on Marcel’s existentialism. I read her thesis and then initiated a brief contact with 
her via email (Joseph, 2005). 
 
The London conference on existential therapy  
Attending the inaugural World Congress for Existential Psychotherapy, titled ‘Freedom, 
Responsibility and the Meaning of Being’, which was held in London from 14 to 17 May, 
2015, enabled me to see, in one setting, the breadth and dynamism of the world-wide 
existential therapy movement (see Appendix One for a detailed report on my involvement).  
Existential therapy is a world-wide movement encompassing many culturally diverse 
approaches. I experienced first-hand the limitations of the “letting being be” philosophy 
inspired by Heidegger in a seminar in which the leader did little to prevent abusive behaviour 
by one of the attendees. This experience complemented my reading of Levinas’ and Stein’s 
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critique of Heidegger’s work. In Chapter 1, as I move towards my definition of existential 
social work, I give an example of the “letting being be” philosophy in the story of the 
Aboriginal man and his dingo. Heidegger believed that he had erred in trying to define being 
through the human experience of being, and in his later work placed being at the centre of his 
philosophy. ‘Let being be’ became his catch cry to existential therapists in his Zollikon 
seminars (Heidegger, 2001). In one sense, Heidegger was correct: when we are fully 
connected with our spirit and environment, we can be fully ourselves and harmless to others. 
But we live in a world in which people do trespass against each other. Not preventing 
harmful actions is itself harmful. For Levinas, ethics is first philosophy, meaning that the 
needs of others must also determine our actions in this world.  
 
The incommensurability of existential thought 
During the confirmation stage of this PhD, I was asked to address the issue of the 
incommensurability of existential thought. “Incommensurability”, here, refers to the idea that 
the foundations, assumptions, premises, and arguments of the key existential thinkers are not 
only inconsistent with but also in opposition to each other. This creates a problem in applying 
existential thought to social work practice. How can you borrow useful ideas from such a 
diverse group of thinkers and bundle them together under one label when the premises of 
their views cannot be reconciled? Would this not result in an eclectic approach to practice in 
which ideas are applied without a coherent framework?  
“Incommensurability” is a concept derived from the philosophy of science. It is 
sometimes confused with the term “incomparability”, which means that two theories cannot 
be compared with one another. Incommensurability means that the two things being 
compared lack a common point of reference against which they can both be measured. When 
people state that existential theories are “incommensurable”, they really mean that they are 
“incomparable”, and are suggesting that these theories cannot be compared or combined 
because the ideas encompassed by the term “existential” are based upon completely different 
premises or paradigms. In this section, I will argue against that proposition.  
A considerable body of secondary literature on existential thought, which began to 
appear in 1938 and has continued to this day, compares, contrasts and combines the work of 
existential thinkers, even if the thinkers themselves have rejected the existential label. This 
literature contains some key findings. Below, I will examine some of the key figures in this 
secondary literature, such as Hazel Barnes (1959), James Collins (1954), William Barrett 
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(1961), Walter Kaufmann (1972) and Kevin Aho (2014). What these key findings might be is 
not always clear. Perhaps one of existential thought’s perennial appeals is its rejection of 
academic philosophy in favour of real-world experience, meaning, in phenomenological 
terms, “the things themselves”, or a return to our concrete or lived experience. Ideas and 
ideology are part of this world and not separate from it.  
One of the central concepts uniting existential thought is freedom. What makes human 
beings different from other species is our ability to choose or decide for ourselves. For Sartre, 
perhaps the existential philosopher most identified with the existentialist label, freedom 
became the central concept. Our consciousness, he thought, is always directed at objects, but 
contains no permanent structures within it. Even our so-called egos are constructs which we 
create and sustain, and which change over time. Our consciousness is in the world, along with 
the self that we have constructed for ourselves. The modern concept of freedom also 
preoccupied philosophers like Hegel, who could see the value of this moral ideal but also 
some of the limitations created by the absence of guidance on its application.  
Like Robert Solomon, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jon Stewart, I assert that Hegel’s 
absolute idealism has been misinterpreted by early existential thinkers, like Kierkegaard, who 
reacted against Danish Hegelianism as it was understood at the time. Hegel was not against 
the individual (Stewart, 2010). These thinkers, Solomon, Merleau-Ponty and Stewart, have 
argued for a stronger association between existentialism and Hegel’s idealism, on the basis 
that Hegel embraces the modern Kantian advocacy of the value of freedom, but avoids Kant’s 
dualism by describing one dynamic, imminent and transcendent reality, a reality in which we 
become more real as we become freer.  
The missing ethical dimension of the good in existentialism is to be found in Hegel, and 
in more recent scholarship on him. Robert Wallace (YEAR) is my key source for this view. 
Merleau-Ponty (1964) argued in ‘Hegel’s Existentialism’ that existentialism has its origins in 
Hegel’s early thought, particularly his Phenomenology of Spirit.  
It is well known that Kierkegaard formed his views in opposition to Hegel, although 
more recent scholarship challenges this view and argues for a more complex relationship 
involving considerable continuity (Stewart, 2003). What is less well known is how important 
existential themes, such as freedom and responsibility, practice and lived experience, were to 
Hegel. I want to argue that these themes are significant in Hegel’s more mature, idealist 
writings, in which his focus was on real freedom, and on how traditional and modern 
individuality could be reconciled, as well as on how transcendence takes place within 
concrete existence.  
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I think that returning to Hegel as an existentialist precursor is one way in which 
existential social work can connect to critical social work theory. By this I mean that the 
social change function of social work practice is aided by having a critical perspective on its 
current form. Hegel provides a dialectical historical perspective that seeks to transform the 
world through ideas. The social change function embraced by the critical school of social 
work is not an optional extra but a necessary part of an existential approach to social work 
practice.  
I am using Hegel’s theory of the three elements of the concept here, namely the 
singular, the particular, and the universal. Existentialism, as a concept, contains these three 
elements, and they are a useful way to describe how a broad critical existential approach to 
social work can be constructed. Again, this idea of the three elements in an existential 
concept comes directly from Hegel.  
In existentialism, there are broad unifying themes that seem to be universal, like 
freedom and responsibility, authenticity, and lived experience. Below that level, there are 
particular existential theories, for example, Sartre’s work on social movements from the 
1960s, which is sometimes described as social existentialism and is contrasted with his more 
early individualistic ethics. Finally, there are singular theoretical elements linked to 
existential theorists that reflect their unique perspectives, such as Camus’ (2000) concept of 
calculated culpability, the idea that in choosing a lesser evil we must acknowledge it is still 
evil and cannot be equated with the good. 
I am applying existential thought to social work practice. This purpose shapes the way I 
explore this field of thought. For example, much of the literary existential writing is not 
applicable to my purpose – even though it is probably the most popular aspect of existential 
writing – unless it explores a particularly relevant subject. In other words, I am refusing to 
restrict my selections simply because their assumptions are not comparable. In social work, 
we use combinations of methods from different theoretical approaches, such as cognitive 
behavioural therapy, in which we separate thinking and feeling processes and show people 
how changing their thinking processes can change their behaviour. From a post-modern 
narrative therapy perspective, I might use art therapy to encourage clients to select pictures 
that represent their family of origin and the family they want now and to tell a story about 
that as a way for them to construct a new storyline for their future lives, separated from the 
dominant narrative of their childhood.  
I would argue that the alleged incomparability of existential thinkers is over-stated. 
Consider the following point: most of these existential thinkers have thoroughly read and 
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absorbed other leading existential thinkers. For example, Sartre read Kierkegaard, Husserl, 
Heidegger and Hegel, amongst many other related theorists. When you read Sartre, those 
influences are obvious. You cannot really read Sartre’s philosophy without some 
understanding of these philosophers, particularly Hegel. Sartre also added new ideas to 
existential thought, with regard to ethics and personal responsibilities. I am not the first social 
worker to argue that there is coherence within existential thought. Neil Thompson (1992), 
while certainly expressing a preference for Sartre’s social existential approach, has also 
written about other existential writers, such as Nietzsche (Thompson, 2008).  
The next section of this exegesis provides an example of an occasion when Sartre drew 
upon his reading of Heidegger’s work on truth to advance his own views on the subject.  
 
How Sartre read Heidegger  
In this section I wish to address the incommensurability argument by looking carefully at 
how the two key existential thinkers developed their understandings of truth. In 1948, Sartre 
is at the peak of his popularity in France, having become a prolific writer. He takes time out 
of his busy schedule to read Heidegger’s Essence of Truth, which was published in Paris that 
year. Heidegger’s book (1988) was based on a series of lectures he gave in 1931–32, which 
drew on writings by Plato. In this work, Heidegger argues that the original meaning of truth 
was “un-concealment”, before it became truth as “correctness” or “correspondence”. He 
argues that the latter concept, which had come to dominate western thought, is derivative 
from the older concept of truth. Heidegger is arguing that the essence of truth is not some 
static notion, but an occurrence in which the human being is actively participating. Being 
likes to remain hidden, and it requires the human to comport herself or himself towards it and 
actively engage with it for the un-concealment to take place. Heidegger’s intent here is to 
expose the whole of western philosophy as having been misguided by a derivative version of 
the truth. He claims to have discovered a more primordial version of the truth that had been 
forgotten for the last 2,000 years. He does not argue against truth as correspondence, only 
that it is secondary to the primary understanding.  
It is well known that Sartre read Being and Time by Martin Heidegger before writing 
his Being and Nothingness and that he was heavily influenced by that work. In 1948, reading 
Heidegger’s latest work, Sartre appropriates Heidegger’s insight into truth as “un-
concealment”, but for Sartre it is humans that unveil being or truth or refuse to unveil it. The 
main theme of Sartre’s work is ignorance, which he regards as an intentional act.  
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To put his argument in a social work context, one could imagine three characteristic 
modes of operating in ignorance of the truth in doing a social work job. The first mode might 
be described as a state of ignorance in innocence. Here, the social worker just wants to “get 
on with the job”. He or she doesn’t want to investigate the truth, but just to get through the 
day as easily as possible, doing only what is required. We can all feel this way, especially 
when we are overwhelmed with demands and there is nothing we can do about it but get 
through the work as painlessly as possible. We are passive towards the truth. Sartre would 
say we are washing our hands of the truth. The second mode is a kind of passive 
contemplation. Here, we simply follow the policy and guidelines as set down by others, as if 
the truth has already been given – “this is the way business is conducted around here”. Sartre 
would say we hide ourselves from our own responsibility to make the truth exist. This is our 
fate; we simply put up with everything. Finally, there can be the use of abstraction as 
ignorance. Here we find social work theorists who write abstractly about social work, without 
any connection to actual practice, only to conceptual truths.  
Sartre argues that for being or truth to appear we have to go and find it. It is often 
suggested that Sartre’s writing in Truth and Existence misconstrues Heidegger, in that in 
Heidegger’s thought it is being that unveils itself – but that is far from Heidegger’s actual 
writing on this matter. Here is Heidegger, using Plato’s allegory of the cave, on the third 
stage, when humanity has escaped from the cave and is in the light of the sun:  
‘The genuine liberation does not only depend on an act of violence, but requires 
persistence and courage to endure the individual stages of adaptation to the 
light, the strident courage that can also wait, that is not deterred by reversals, 
that knows that in all genuine becoming and growing, no stage can be leapt 
over, that empty busyness is just as useless and disastrous as blind enthusiasm’ 
(Heidegger, 2002, p. 33). 
This is hardly a meditative approach to letting being be. Sartre embraced Heidegger’s 
text and adapted it to his purposes; this is the foundation of Sartre’s version of truth in 
freedom:  
‘Thus man [sic] can choose no-truth. This non-truth is ignorance or 
lie…Unveiling implies that what is unveiled is originally veiled. Subjectively, 
this means that man’s condition is originally ignorance. Finally, the unveiling 
behaviour is activity. To allow being to appear as it is, we have to go and look 
for it’ (Sartre, 1992, p. 13).  
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Sartre never sought to publish this work during his lifetime, as he followed his own 
advice in finding the truth for himself. He had already uncovered a new social existentialism 
by combining Marxist thought with existentialism in the post-war period. Truth and 
Existence was only published in 1989, nine years after Sartre’s death. In 1948, Sartre was 
focused on rebuilding existentialism on a redeveloped and rethought Marxist philosophy, 
informed also by Freud and existential biography, but he took the time to read Heidegger’s 
new work and was obviously inspired enough to write his response. There is far more that is 
commensurable between the two works than is incommensurable. Truth and Existence shows 
existentialism at work, Sartre building upon Heidegger, perhaps with different purposes in 
mind, and yet both illuminate some aspect of truth that is not found in other works.  
I am not saying I agree with either author. Sartre’s concept is too human-determined, 
Heidegger places the initiative with being itself and with our comportment towards it. I have 
concerns about Heidegger’s statement on violence in un-concealment, as mentioned in the 
excerpt above. I think there is an ethical component in truth seeking that requires relating to 
others in non-harmful ways, which neither author mentions. But my purpose here was not to 
assess these thinkers’ work, but simply to show how closely they relate to one another.   
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Being-in-the-world 
All existential thought shares a fundamental belief in challenging the subject-object divide 
created by Cartesian thought. This is the existential concept of being-in-the-world 
(Heidegger), person-in-the-world (Stein, Marcel), or life-world (Husserl).  
While there are subtle differences between these concepts, they share an existential 
phenomenological unity: our consciousness is in the world, and not separate from it. We are 
beings who are open to the world. We cannot pretend to stand outside the world and observe 
it objectively, as if our presence and observation does not affect the things we are observing. 
This stands in opposition to the empirical view (i.e. that the external world of facts is 
independent of consciousness), and to the scientistic view that the only reality or real truth is 
that which is studied objectively through the natural sciences or equivalent methods. It also 
stands in opposition to idealism, (the view that ideas create the world, and not the other way 
around), often associated with spiritual perspectives; for example, that all reality is maya or 
illusion, or that it is just a figment of our imagination – among the categories of existential 
philosophy, only Buddhist existentialism proposes that the world is illusory (Millar, 2008).  
We participate in the world through the interaction of our bodies, minds and spirits. 
Atheistic existential thought tends to be closed, a priori, to the idea that a non-material spirit 
world exists; proponents of this view choose to close themselves off from the spiritual. The 
atheistic existential view is as much a belief as is the belief in a spiritual world. An existential 
view that is more open to spiritual phenomena need not be theistic, because that term 
connotes a belief in a superior being. Like many indigenous belief systems, existential 
thought can include a belief in or openness to more than the finite or material aspects of the 
world. These non-material aspects of reality include the ethical, the mythological, the 
emotional, and the mysterious. These things are as much in the world as the more obvious 
material things. But spiritually inclined existential thinkers can still gain a lot by reading 
atheistic philosophers such as Sartre and de Beauvoir, simply because their insights into the 
concrete world are so significant – they just need to bear in mind that their a priori refusal to 
accept the spirit world limits the scope of their thought on such matters.  
The fact of our being as a part of the world entails interconnection and interdependence 
with the world. It is incumbent upon us to act in the world to make it a better place. Thus we 
must create ethical priorities for our fragile and vulnerable finite lives (as found in the “face 
of the other”), and challenge the technological trends that treat humans and animals as things 
to be used, as “standing reserve” and only of instrumental value. The existential nature of 
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social work necessitates this, based on our commitments to ourselves and others, including to 
other animals and the environment. Much of what we do in social work is based on this 
unconditional concern, these “musts” which are built upon our committed practice. A critical 
social worker, for example, is committed to social change and transformation towards social 
justice. This is not a matter of commitment. It is this deeper personal meaning in social work 
that is the focus of an existential view. Robyn Miller provides a powerful example of this 
meaning when she describes using a narrative approach to connect with a male client’s pain 
as “his story”, only to be told by the client that ‘love, that’s not my story, it’s my life’ (Miller, 
2016, p. 145). As the American existential writer Bugbee (1961) states, it is based on a 
relationship to ourselves, revealed from our concrete lived experiences, from which we 
discover our commitments, the things we must do.  
Discovering this lesser known spiritual version of existentialism helped me to find my 
perspective within existential thought. I was particularly struck by the work of William 
Luijpen (1960) on existential phenomenology, which argued that there is a core element of 
the existential phenomenological outlook that takes in the work of Merleau-Ponty, 
Heidegger, Sartre, and Marcel. This is the concept of being-in-the-world which I have 
discussed above. Learning how existential thought progressed throughout the 20th century 
also brought light to my search. I discovered that Levinas was there at the very beginning of 
Sartre’s study of Husserl’s phenomenology with his early work, The Theory of Intuition in 
Husserl’s Phenomenology (1991).  
 
After the Second World War, Levinas’ writing is a deep reflection on and critique of 
the flaws and limitations of Heidegger’s obsession with being, which Heidegger regarded as 
the most neglected and misunderstood concept in the history of western thought. I also 
discovered Edith Stein’s (2007) previously unpublished review and comments on 
Heidegger’s Being and Time, and her work helped me appreciate her profoundness, in spite 
of her being largely neglected as an existential philosopher. Both Levinas and Stein, by 
adding a viewpoint different from the more atheistic existentialism of Heidegger or Sartre, 
helped me to write Chapter 1.   
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Incommensurability and lessons from the secondary literature  
The secondary literature adds to the argument that there is a collection of distinct but 
connected views that express the existential position. The secondary literature mentioned 
above includes critics of existentialism, such as Collins (1962) and Kaufmann (1973), and 
advocates such as Barnes (1959, 1977) and Barrett (1956, 1961). The selection of works 
discussed here was published over a span of more than 50 years, between 1959 and 2014. 
 
Hazel Barnes  
In Hazel Barnes’ autobiography The Story I Tell Myself (1997), she discusses the background 
to her first book, The Literature of Possibility: A Study in Humanistic Existentialism, which 
she wrote after translating Sartre’s Being and Nothingness for its first English language 
edition. In her book, Barnes synthesises the literary thought of Albert Camus, Simone de 
Beauvoir, and Jean Paul Sartre. Camus and Sartre had already had a very pubic falling out, 
and Camus had disavowed the label existentialist. In her autobiography, Barnes published a 
letter she had written to Camus and his reply. In her letter to Camus, Barnes apologies for 
describing Camus as an existentialist and comments that Camus’ insights often completed or 
developed more fully the views of Sartre and de Beauvoir. Camus, in reply, states that he 
preferred the title ‘existential writer’ (Barnes, 1997, p. 160). This is not merely of historical 
interest; here Barnes is supplementing the existentialism of Sartre and de Beauvoir with the 
existential writing of Camus. Similarly, I have adopted Camus designation and titled my 
work ‘The Challenge of Existential Social Work Practice’ in line with Camus’ response to 
Barnes.  
Social work writer Neil Thompson makes a distinction between existentialist writing on 
social work, which he claims involves the application of Sartre’s Marxist existentialism to 
social work, and the “existential” in social work, which he argues covers too broad a range, 
because lots of issues in social work could be considered “existential”. While it is true that 
the word “existential” embraces a broader range of writing than does the label existentialist 
(Aho, 2014), it is not the case that all social work writing is existential. There is a lot of 
abstract writing in social work that is not related to concrete practice, nor to the lived 
experience of social workers and their clients. Like Camus, however, I have chosen the word 
“existential” over Thompson’s “existentialist” to entail a broader range of approaches to 
existential thought than Sartre, and to focus on the concrete lived experience of social work 
practice.  
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This approach allows me to describe Jane Hoey as an existential administrator on the 
basis of her ethical and professional stance on social policy and administration. Jane Hoey 
was the first Director of the United States Bureau of Public Assistance and her story is told in 
Chapter five of the book. It enables me to provide an alternative view to Thompson on 
existential social work, a view that is not restricted to social work informed by existentialism, 
but which expresses an existential viewpoint that could almost be described as the “inner 
lived experience” of social work. Thompson attempts to understand social work from an 
existing existentialist theoretical perspective, as first described by Sartre. I am basing my 
existential approach on the concrete necessities of social work practice, an approach based 
partly on our lived experience of social work, and on the revealed meanings, values and 
understandings gained from this experience, including existential ones.  
Barnes never read Heidegger. She and I experienced a similar aversion, based on his 
association with Nazism. Her existentialism came close to the atheism of Sartre’s, although in 
her autobiography she admits that she found his approach to human relationships somewhat 
aloof and cold. Her inclusion of Camus and de Beauvoir aims to correct the flaws or 
limitations she had found in aspects of Sartre. She called this new philosophy ‘humanistic 
existentialism’. This is curious, because in the USA existential therapy is also often 
associated with these ideas, being described as “humanist existential therapy”, which 
combines the client-centred approach of Rogers (1980) with the existential therapy of Yalom 
(1980), May (1950) and others. Here is Barnes description of humanistic existentialism:  
‘The concept of the absurdity of existence, the concern to justify man’s  [sic] resolve 
to live meaningfully in the face of an indifferent universe, the philosophical analysis 
of the basis of human solidarity, the ideas of authenticity and bad faith, the refusal to 
accept a society based on the assumption of absolute good and evil, a sympathy for 
those scapegoats who are sacrificed to social expediency, a feeling for the absolute 
value of the individual combined with the recognition that one cannot today live 
wholly innocently-all this based on an explicit or implied psychology which holds that 
every man is free but that we are all responsible for the situation within which a 
freedom must choose itself’ (Barnes, 1959, p. 376).  
 While her book is restricted to the three writers mentioned, Barnes remarks that in her 
public lectures she always constructed her talks around Paul Tillich’s triad of basic anxieties 
that all humans experience in the face of our finitude, as set out in his book The Courage to 
Be (2000). These three basic anxieties are of fate and death, of emptiness and 
meaninglessness, and of guilt and condemnation. Much of human life is devoted to avoiding 
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the despair engendered by these anxieties. Tillich wrote his book while supervising Rollo 
May’s PhD, which was eventually published in book form in The Meaning of Anxiety (1950). 
Tillich had May read everything ever published on anxiety, but the two writers who most 
strongly shaped his work were Kierkegaard, particularly his The Concept of Anxiety (first 
published in 1844), and Freud. Tillich was inspired by May’s work, and particularly by the 
idea of the necessity of courage in the face of anxiety, to write The Courage to Be. I mention 
this anecdote of relationships of influence to demonstrate how close the links are across 
existential thought over the past two centuries. Barnes’ book was one of the first attempts to 
draw together a common viewpoint from amongst the key, but until then seemingly disparate, 
existential writers. Barnes’ writings and friendship with Betty Cannon would result in the 
latter writing her book Sartre and Psychoanalysis (1991), which argues for an existential 
psychodynamic therapy framework. 
 
William Barrett  
William Barrett introduced existentialism to the reading public of America in his bestseller 
Irrational Man (1958), which argued from the premise that existentialism’s popularity 
reflected a deep dissatisfaction with academic linguistic philosophy and its sense of 
detachment from real life. He captures the mood of existential thinking and the unifying 
themes addressed by existential thinkers:  
 ‘People do die, people struggle all their lives between the demands of real and 
counterfeit selves, and we do live in an age in which neurotic anxiety has mounted out 
of all proportion so that even minds inclined to believe that all problems can be solved 
by physical techniques begin to label ‘mental health’ as the first of our public 
problems’ (Barrett, 1958, p. 9).  
It was this attention to the concrete issues affecting all lives and society as a whole, as 
opposed to the abstract approach taken by academic philosophy, which attracted people to 
existentialism. These concrete issues were always obvious or immediately present; they had 
to be investigated. Here is Jean Wahl from his 1932 book Towards the Concrete, one of the 
first works to address existential thought:  
‘The concrete is never the given; it is pursued. It is not in the absence of thought that 
the concrete can reveal itself to us. This is what the young Hegel sensed and many 
poets as well. A dialectic is necessary precisely because there is a realism here. The 
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real is the limit of the dialectic. It is its origin, its end, its explanation and its 
destruction’ (Wahl, cited in Flynn, 2006, p. 356).  
Wahl is assuming agreement about reality, but he is also saying that the existential view 
will not end with a well-constructed, abstract, illuminating theory, such as that developed by 
Hegel. Principles can guide our behaviour, but there is always this moment – experience, 
client, group, social movement – that is happening right now, that needs attention and focus. 
There is always the concrete. Similarly, in Irrational Man, Barrett (1958) critiques the other 
major alternative to existentialism, Marxist humanism, for its failure to account for the 
‘thoroughly problematic nature of man, this highly questionable and self-questioning animal’ 
(p. 273). Barrett (1958) argues that the actual experience of communist movements, in their 
quest for power rather than the transformation of humanity, owes more to Nietzsche than to 
Marx. Barrett defined existentialism as: 
‘a philosophy that confronts the human situation in its totality to ask what the 
basic conditions of human existence are and how man can establish his own 
meaning out of these conditions. Its method is to begin with this human 
existence as a fact without any readymade pre-conceptions about the essence of 
man. There is no prefabricated human nature that freezes human possibilities 
into a pre-ordained mould. On the contrary man exists first and makes himself 
what he is out of the conditions into which he is thrown. “Existence precedes 
essence” as the formula puts it’ (Barrett, 1956, p. 127).  
 
Walter Kaufmann 
Walter Kaufmann (1956) argues that existentialism is ‘not a philosophy but a label’ (p. 11). 
After documenting the range and diversity of views that fall within that label, Kaufmann 
(1972) asserts that the primary binding element is the ‘refusal to belong to any school of 
thought, the repudiation of any body of beliefs whatever, and especially of systems and a 
marked dissatisfaction with traditional philosophy as superficial, academic and remote from 
life – that is the heart of existentialism’ (p. 12). He critiques the existentialists for their failure 
to remain true to their value of freedom. Kaufmann maintains that the existentialists could not 
live with their extreme subjectivism, which seemed to imply a moral anarchy; the rationalist 
ego can maintain a view that now anything goes. How do we insist on responsible decision 
making? The existentialists have various responses to that question, but Kaufmann (1973) 
argues that they have invariably been forced address what he calls “decidophopia”, or the fear 
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of autonomy. He states that choosing responsibly means weighing alternatives, and here 
Kaufmann, like the existentialists, is focusing on major decisions that give shape to your life. 
Kaufmann clearly has in mind Sartre’s concept of bad faith, which focuses on the human 
tendency to act as if you are not free. Kaufmann lists five strategies people use to escape from 
autonomy:  
1. Adherence to religion/authority/a school of thought/a social movement. This is four 
strategies rolled into one, but they appear to amount to the same thing: we make a 
decision (for example, I am going to be an existentialist), and then all decisions in my 
life flow from the consequent subservience to the chosen authority. Kaufmann describes 
this as the most common strategy, and the trouble with it is that very few such forms of 
authority can withstand the constant change involved in modernity – most eventually 
show evidence of disintegration. In choosing a school of thought, our basic decisions 
have been made, and thus some things have become an unquestioned framework. Now, 
only the smaller choices are required of us. Rival schools of thought are ignored. 
Kaufmann describes this as micro-scopism, and he gives an example; when Sartre 
adopted Marxism as his philosophy: ‘Everything we established in The Problem of 
Method follows from our fundamental agreement with historical materialism,’ writes 
Sartre (2004, p. 15).  
2. Drifting. This consists of two alternatives: adherence to “status-quo-ism”, which is just 
following mainstream views without much thought, and becoming a drop-out, someone 
who lives for the moment without any ties, traditions, code, or purpose, leaving things to 
change on their own. Kaufmann mentions Meursault in Camus’ The Stranger as an 
archetypal drop-out drifter.  
3. Exegetical thinking. Here the authority of a text becomes your own through your analysis 
of it – the text becomes your authority. Your interpretation of the text enables you to be 
an authority. Kaufmann points to Heidegger’s dismissal of the whole of western 
philosophy, before the maturation of his thought in Being and Time, and to his embrace 
of pre-Socratic thought (which is fragmented and open to diverse interpretations), by 
which he read his own interpretation into the texts. The same happens with Holderin’s 
poetry in the later Heidegger’s obsession with being as the sole source of meaning and 
his rejection of philosophy as a method through which being can be disclosed.  
4. Manichaeism. A situation in which a decision is not required, because the decision is 
loaded by black and white thinking. Inconvenient facts are ignored, history is falsified, 
uncomfortable arguments are discredited. Heidegger’s definitions of authenticity and 
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inauthenticity are couched in this contrasting way; but a person can be resolutely 
authentic and support dishonest, inauthentic social movements, like fascism.  
5. Moral rationalism. Kaufmann describes this as evasion of autonomy by arguing that all 
that matters is rationality or logic. The opposite is moral irrationalism, when rational 
matters are considered completely irrelevant to key decisions, as some existential 
thinkers like Kierkegaard and Heidegger have maintained. Kaufmann supports neither 
position.  
 
Kaufmann also lists other strategies for avoiding autonomy, such as pedantry, which is 
a form of creeping micro-scopism, marriage as a “committee of two”, and finally trendyism, 
or following the “wave of the future”, as Sartre did when he described Marxism as the 
‘philosophy for our time’ (Kaufmann, 1973, p. 26). After Kaufmann’s analysis, I am left 
wondering what is left of autonomy. Perhaps it is a myth.  
All these criticisms assume that deciding is something we do in some completely 
isolated bubble, beyond the influence of the world. Other writers must surely influence our 
views. We are all shaped by social movements and ideologies. I reject Kaufmann’s criticisms 
of Sartre and other existential thinkers. There is a harshness to his writing, which reflects 
bitterness at his assigned role of conservative critic of existential thought. I also think he is 
wrong to argue that existentialism rejects all systematic thinking. As I have already stated, 
Sartre, for example, studied many other writers, including Bergson, Husserl, Heidegger, 
Hegel, and later Marx, before developing his own ideas. Kaufmann’s (1973) uncritical 
advocacy of Solzhenitsyn as an exemplar of autonomy, who supported Putin’s earlier claims 
on the Ukraine in the name of pan-Slavism and a return to imperial Russia, demonstrates 
what unreflective criticism can miss in its focus on condemnation.  
 
James Collins  
Perhaps no other secondary source has had more influence on my thinking than my tattered 
paperback copy of James Collin’s Existentialism, published in early 1952, and bought from a 
second-hand bookshop for two dollars. Collins is specific about his perspective. His critical 
approach is to weigh existentialism from the viewpoint of theism and realism, informed by 
the Catholic saints Augustine and Aquinas. His work is very scholarly, and he summarizes 
the essence of the key existential thinkers Sartre, Jaspers, Marcel, and Heidegger. I went on 
to buy other books by Collins, including a 1962 book which contained the first English 
31 
 
language summary of the work of Edith Stein. His stance as a theist is unique among 
secondary commentators, because he seems to appreciate that existentialism’s rejection of 
God and its atheistic phase were an essential part of its journey into the limelight during its 
adolescence in the 1950s. Collins summarizes his view about existentialism’s future in a way 
that seems to resonate with my views on its popular phase:  
‘Either under their own power or in alliance with an existential metaphysics of 
the infinite and the finite modes of being, the existentialists will have to 
reconsider their major themes, now that the first outlines have been sketched’ 
(Collins, 1952, p. 251). 
  
Kevin Aho  
I have already commented on Aho’s introductory text Existentialism (2014), but I would add 
that his explanation of the core elements of the existential outlook is consistent with what I 
have written above, particularly the central concept of being-in-the-world. Aho’s text also 
includes up-to-date connections between Buddhist thought and existential concepts, relating 
letting go of attachments and suffering to their impact on our health. He is also aware of the 
now-global reach of existential thought, and of its continued relevance in fighting oppression 
through critical existential perspectives (Matustik, 1993), as well as of black (Gordon, 1997; 
O’Bassey, 2007; Gordon, 2008) and feminist existential writing (Welsh, 2015). Aho is also 
very aware of the diverse impacts of existential thinking on therapy and mental illness. Aho 
ultimately sides with the limited atheistic perspective in describing existentialism through 
literary studies that emphasized the limitations and struggle of finite existence, and the loss of 
any absolutes, leading to the need for self-creation of meaning. I explore the links between 
existential and critical social work later in this exegesis.  
  
32 
 
Categorizing Existential thought 
Existential thought has been classified in various ways. There is the traditional classification 
of atheistic versus religious, which was first publicly expressed by Sartre in his famous 
impromptu talk ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’ (2007). 
 
Table 1. Existentialists Categorized According to Belief in God 
Atheist Religious 
Heidegger Kierkegaard 
Nietzsche Jaspers 
Sartre Marcel 
Camus Hegel 
De Beauvoir Buber 
 
The problem with this classification is that there is as much difference within the categories 
as between them, so other methods of classification have been tried, such as a hermeneutic 
comparison between the monological or strict existentialists, who are supposed to be 
exclusively focused on the individual, and the dialogical existentialists who are anti-
Cartesian, along the lines of Heidegger’s critique of Sartre (see Table 2, below.  
 
Table 2. Existentialists Categorized Hermeneutically 
Early, Cartesian, Monological, 
“Individual” Existentialism 
Later, Dialogical, Anti-Cartesian, 
hermeneutic, and social existentialism 
Nietzsche Buber 
Early Sartre Heidegger 
Camus 
Later Sartre (Marxist and post-Marxist 
phase) 
Kierkegaard Jaspers 
Dostoevsky Merleau-Ponty 
Kafka Marcel 
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Clearly this division favours the dialogical hermeneutic version of existentialism, which is 
based on Hegel and Heidegger. These thinkers shared a concern for the relational, but there 
are substantial differences between their approaches, so this split remains problematic. 
Similarly, theorists also find problems in the splitting of Sartre’s earlier and later thought.  
There is no denying that there are significant differences amongst the key existential 
thinkers. However, they do share common concerns, and one of these is the view of 
existential thought as a way of life or social movement. This is reflected in their ethical 
concerns, emphasis on the concrete or real, and a return to a meaningful philosophy that 
affects how we live and work. In this view, existential thought is heir to the original 
Socratic/Platonic view, in which philosophy guided decisions, actions, and way of life.  
As I have already described, existential phenomenology – a viewpoint shared by 
Marcel, Sartre, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and others – does have an illuminating unity 
around the fundamental concept of our existence as beings-in-the-world. What creates 
divergence between these scholars is that some were committed atheists, such as Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, who rejected a priori the existence of a supreme being. Others, 
such as Marcel, were theists. I have previously stated that belief in a supreme being is not a 
necessary condition for a belief that the world contains more than the finite.  
 
What is existential social work practice?  
Frederic Reamer, in The Philosophical Foundations of Social Work (1993), acknowledges a 
failure to address the philosophies of religion and existentialism in social work. I was 
surprised by this failure, and by the marginal status given to existential thought, particularly 
as I was aware of how influenced Neil Thompson had been by existentialism, how 
underpinned by existentialism were his popular works, and how little attention was paid to 
existential theory in social work theory courses. Paradoxically, existential therapy was 
thriving both as a kind of meta-theory for therapists, allowing them to use other theories 
within an overarching existential framework, and in specific schools of existential therapy, 
such as those influenced by European Dasein analysis using Heideggerian thought and 
phenomenology (Cohn, 2002), philosophical approaches (Van Deurzen, 2010) and logotherapy 
(Guttmann, 1996). I was also interested in closely aligned schools of thought, such as the 
short-lived, but highly influential, approach of David Brandon (1979) in creative social work 
practice.  
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In studying Hegel’s Science of Logic with a Marxist reading group, I became aware of 
how closely existentialism had evolved with, sometimes in response to, and also from, 
Hegel’s absolute idealism. I was studying Hegel within the context of his value for 
understanding social movements and the split between the social and the individual. I have 
used his theory of the singular, particular and universal parts of concepts to describe how 
existential social work should be conceived (see Figure 2, below). 
 
Figure 2. The Singular, Particular and Universal Elements of Existential Social Work 
 
 
In the first chapter of the book, I define existential social work practice as focusing:  
‘on the lived relational existence of people, which is always more than any 
amount of thought can explain. It aims to support people to create their infinite 
potential in the concrete world. An existential approach aims to create safe and 
peaceful spaces for client and worker growth, to prevent further harm and to 
enhance positive change processes. An existential approach creates this space, 
even in social control situations where statutory obligations are in force.  
Being is difficult to describe, but perhaps this is where existential thought 
aims to create an experience of being fully alive, or of a more abundant life for 
ourselves and our clients. Social workers’ and our clients’ beings are threatened 
by external forces, such as technology, global warming, our own fallibility, 
frailty and death, the slow malaise of loss of purpose and meaning, and negative 
emotions, including rejection of self and others, and loss of destiny and identity.  
Existential social work acknowledges the oppressive circumstances of 
clients’ lives and how this shapes and determines their decision making and 
coping abilities. It aims to strengthen their abilities to grow, despite this 
Social work 
  
You, the 
social worker 
Your field of 
service 
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oppression, and helps them take responsibility for shaping their own lives. To 
do this effectively requires the social worker to take responsibility, as a 
professional helper, for their own growth and development, and to live their life 
to the fullest extent (Taft, 1928)’ (Griffiths, forthcoming).  
Referring back to Figure 2, above, I wanted to incorporate a number of ideas from 
existential thought that I considered valuable in describing practice. The first is that practice 
must involve the person – the critical reflective social worker, the singular or subject – as a 
unique person. Secondly, it cannot be objectified separately from the people delivering and 
clients receiving services in the context of a field of service (such as, say, child protection). 
How is existential social work practice applied in child protection with all its policies and 
procedures, risk management strategies, and other onerous responsibilities? These are the 
particular aspects of where you are practising social work in historical time, in a field of 
service. Thirdly, as a social worker, you represent the profession. This is the universal aspect 
of the concept of existential social work practice, in the sense that it applies to the profession 
as a whole. What aspects of existential social work practice apply to all fields of service and 
all individual social workers? 
In relation to the universal aspect, Paul Tillich (1962) describes social work as 
addressing human insufficiency in every unique situation. We listen sensitively and respond 
spontaneously to the concrete circumstances. As social workers we pursue program 
objectives, but we also respond to the uniqueness, to the cry within the situation, instead of 
imposing our agenda. Of course we compare each case with others, but we notice the 
incomparable and the unique aspects, too. We use empirical and participatory knowledge, 
and being is revealed through creating the conditions for growth – under which the social 
worker creates boundaries, safety, respect and a sense of place. That is why social work is 
more than evidence-based practice; it has spiritual, social and ethical dimensions.   
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The empirical in existential social work  
Table 3. The Place of Empiricism in Social Work 
Clients  Intervention  Outcomes 
The lived experience  The lived experience  The lived experience  
Are we comparing similar 
cases? Are their 
structural/cultural 
circumstances similar?  
Vagueness/Differences  
Goals of intervention. 
What actual service did the 
client get?  
Why not something else?  
Outputs and Outcomes 
Unintended/Unanticipated 
impacts. 
  
The table above suggests that an existential account of social work practice would include the 
lived experience of the clients before, during and after the social work intervention. This 
account would insist on fair comparisons of cases by looking carefully at the PCS model 
(Thompson, 2006) of the client’s facticity or social circumstances. Interventions are often 
vaguely described, and it is unclear, because of this, exactly what the client received. Why 
did they get this service and not another? Is it because it was the only one available? Would 
another service have been more appropriate? Can we attribute the outcomes to the 
intervention, or were other factors influencing the cases? Does the program logic reflect the 
lived experiences of the clients, or is it other things that are really valued and influencing the 
outcomes?  
An existential approach is not in opposition to empirical social work or evidence-based 
practice; it wants all the evidence presented, including the mysterious; the fact that I am 
involved in this particular situation and am not some (illusory) objective observer. An 
existential approach goes beyond evidence to search for meaning from the participants in 
their lived experience of the program and its impact on their lives.  
 
Existential and critical social work  
Existential social work, as a critical practice, aims to challenge dominant narratives and 
structures that oppress others. For example, in my current area of practice, male family 
violence, there has been significant reform of our understanding of the problem over the past 
ten years. Public responses to family violence have dramatically altered in both civil and 
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criminal law, in police codes of conduct, and in the development of an integrated family 
violence system in which more information is shared between agencies and limited 
confidentiality is the norm. While family violence is being challenged, there are still 
deficiencies in the system. The effort that has gone into legal reform, human service 
development and police cultural reform (as a result of pressure from activists challenging 
patriarchy, family violence and abuse, and promoting equality between the genders, and 
safety in families) should be acknowledged.  
At the coalface, this is reflected in men’s behaviour change programs which are 
challenging the embedded power and control stories of the participants, and which aim to 
change their ways of thinking about members of their families and of ensuring their safety. 
Many men attending these programs still think that they are the victims. They may be 
unaware of their entrenched practices of power and control over others. These practices have 
to be challenged sensitively and spontaneously in a group process, where partners and 
children are, metaphorically, brought into the room, and the impacts of the men’s behaviours 
are challenged. In addition, the men leave these groups, hopefully, with increased skill in 
creating safe and peaceful spaces in their family homes in which conflict can be addressed 
constructively and non-violently.  
In facilitating these groups, the group leaders are allowing the participants to be 
reflective, choice-making people, people who are experiencing imminent challenges aimed at 
transcending their narrow, self-interested perspectives. In this kind of work, metaphysical 
issues and beliefs are present in the room. Do I have a right to intervene with this man in this 
incident at this time? What is the meaning of events for this man or group? As facilitators of 
these groups, we work with the process to allow the truth about family violence to be 
revealed. We intend for this to happen, and we construct activities to encourage it to occur, 
but we cannot make these moments happen. We have to recognize that some men may decide 
to intentionally remain in ignorance – but we still aim to create the best conditions for their 
collaboration with the unveiling of truth.  
My view is that existential social work is a form of critical social work because it seeks 
transformation of the kind just described, not just adjustment to or improvement of the 
system. This work has a vision. It demands a considerable amount from social workers who 
embrace this approach because it requires a creative awareness of being present and available 
to every client. It attempts to change lives, to transform outlooks, to seek truth through 
discovery with clients and to help them take action to transform their circumstances. This is 
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not a process in which the social worker has all the answers, but one in which we are in 
partnership with our clients on a journey of discovery.  
 
Development of each chapter  
In this final section of the exegesis, I comment on the process by which I developed the 
content of each of the book’s eight chapters.  
 
Chapter 1 – Being-in-the-social work-world  
In this chapter, I examine the dawn of existential social work, using elements of Heidegger’s 
approach to existential phenomenology in Being and Time to think through social work from 
first principles. I have also been influenced by Levinas’ and Stein’s critique of Heidegger’s 
finite approach to being, and their unique contributions to the study of the question: What 
does it mean to be a social worker today? During my research, I discovered that Mary 
Richmond (1922), one of the founders of social casework, had thought through the concept of 
social casework from first principles using ontological language, like the being of social 
casework.  
Building upon my own direct practice experience in family violence, I attempt to 
examine the challenges that social work is facing in the 21st century, including increased 
demand for services, the spread and development of digital technologies, and a loss of 
purpose and meaning. I examine this phenomenon from the ground up, at the coalface of 
practice, rather than using the more usual strategy of examining the external forces impinging 
upon social work practice. I also give a number of practice examples and vignettes designed 
to challenge students and new social workers to think seriously about their vocation as social 
workers and what they want to achieve in their social work careers.  
 
Chapter 2 – Immortal social work: The first existential social work practice 
This chapter begins my account of the history of existential thought in social work practice, 
commencing with the Functional school created by Jessie Taft, who was strongly influenced 
by Otto Rank, one of the first psycho-analysts and a founder of will therapy.  
I have tried to show the creative core of the Functional School, rather than focus on 
agency function, in the idea of “voluntary acceptance of the obligatory”, a phrase made 
famous by Otto Rank.  In social work terms, this phrase refers to the limitations that clients 
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need to accept if they are going to effectively use what a particular program has to offer them. 
A number of social work articles have already linked the Functional School to existential 
thought, and Otto Rank’s biographer also used the phrase to describe his theories. I have 
made this link more explicit by focusing on the existential elements of Taft’s thinking. I am 
also very much aware that Taft was influenced by pragmatism as well, and by early social 
interactionism. I use two vignettes in this chapter, both from Taft’s work, that I feel 
exemplify the clarity that she brings to the unique function of the social work task.  
 
Chapter 3 – Existential social work comes of age 
In this chapter, I explore the pioneers of existential thought in social work practice who 
explicitly identified themselves as existential thinkers, and some who rejected the label but 
may be described as fellow travellers, such as Ruth Wilkes (1981), on account of their use of 
existential thought in social work. 
I reject the notion that existential thought should give up traditional, core social work 
and existential values like individualization. I see a trend under which these historical social 
work concepts are being adopted by management and market forces and are thus being 
limited to narrow consumerist aims. I argue that existential social workers need to re-assert 
these values – providing they are combined with a critique of traditional social work’s failure 
to address oppression and to ensure that the uniqueness and lived experience of clients are 
always addressed in their interventions.  
I include two case examples in this chapter to help students identify existential issues 
when clients are presenting, and to help them question the assumption that western values are 
necessarily more enlightened than other cultural values that clients might maintain.  
 
Chapter 4 – Existential social work assessment and intervention  
Here I examine how an existential approach to assessment and intervention in social work 
might look in comparison to existential therapy, which tends to de-emphasize assessment and 
intervention. I argue that it is perfectly consistent with existential theory to use tools and 
categories to assess people, providing we always understand and acknowledge the limitations 
of these methods. Individuals are always more than any label placed upon them.  
I begin the chapter with an example from R. D. Laing (1971), which makes a crucial 
point about assessment as a discovery process. I then make use of Yalom’s (1980) illustration 
of an original case by Sigmund Freud (2001), in which he highlights the importance of the 
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informal “add-ons” that the worker intuitively initiates in the professional relationship. 
Yalom sees these add-ons as crucial to effective practice. Closer analysis of Freud’s case 
reveals other complexities to in assessment and intervention, such as the powerful influence 
of the professional worker on the lay client’s understanding of what is happening. While 
there are both oppressive and caring elements to Freud’s case, it also highlights the debt 
existential thought owes to the psycho-social history of the profession.  
I then explore various modern and post-modern approaches, and I continue to argue 
that the lived experience of assessment and intervention are a vital part of the process and 
cannot be ignored – agencies and program increasingly prescribe these practices. The social 
worker plays a critical role in engaging clients and helping them make sense of what is 
happening. I provide an example of how social work can engage with an LGBTI person, 
which also illustrates how existential social work differs from existential therapy.  
I had hoped to include a section on existential biography and social work assessment in 
this chapter, but the more I learnt about Sartre’s efforts in this area the less I wanted to 
include this material. I became convinced that his totalization project was fatally flawed in its 
attempt to completely comprehend another human being using Freudian and Marxist theory. 
Particularly for social work, our assessments are time- and circumstance-limited documents 
that cannot wholly enclose another person’s life.  
 
Chapter 5 – Existential social work in social policy, social movements and team work 
In this chapter, I examine all the indirect services that social workers are involved in, such as 
team work, social policy, social movements and policy implementation.  
For most of this chapter, I draw upon my own ongoing experience in working in a small 
family violence team, but also from my social work history in policy, social movements and 
being involved in a pilot program. I draw upon the concept of “field of service” because it 
sees significant use in social work practice (Bartlett, 1971). Increasingly, separate programs 
and agencies are being required to organize their interventions within a field of service, like 
family violence or child protection, which has collective aims.  
The first lived experience for all social workers doing direct practice in the area of 
indirect service is team work. I provide examples from my own experience in men’s 
behaviour change programs of how you need to do the work in order to find a personal 
perspective on what you are doing. I describe my own experiences of social movement and 
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policy work and of the community work of the Reach organization in Melbourne as an 
example of successful program implementation.  
I then recount the story of Jane Hoey (1953), an existential social administrator and 
leader who had the courage to stand up to a newly elected Republican president based on her 
firm understanding of her position as a professional implementer of policy, not a political 
formulator of it. Hoey had a deep grounding in the social mission of public welfare. Her 
stance was ethical and based on a creative loyalty to her mission as a social administrator of 
America’s first welfare system. Hoey never used existentialist concepts, but her deep 
commitment to the social mission of public welfare makes her approach an existential one. 
This loyalty extended to her refusal to resign or go quietly, which she must have known 
would result in her dismissal. This stand reflects her knowledge of herself, and her 
commitment to her profession and the provision of public welfare.  
In the next example, I show how social work leadership depends on other elites 
supporting rather than undermining social objectives. Social work is not a powerful or 
privileged profession relative to other elite professionals like Doctors and Lawyers. Critical 
social work tends to ignore the marginal role social work has in determining its social change 
aims. An existential approach is cognisant of how more powerful professional groupings can 
undermine social work objectives.  
I finish this chapter by looking at the lessons learned from a successful pilot program 
that was legislated state-wide within ten years. What made the difference when others had 
failed? Success in social policy and implementation cannot be wholly explained by the 
project implementation process; something more is required. I use Johnathon Lee’s account 
of radical hope to argue for the role of vision in social work practice, and provide an example 
of how I have successfully used my visioning skills for program administration.  
 
Chapter 6 – Creative social work and existential social work 
Now I tackle the issue of the role of creativity in social work practice, and what an existential 
approach might bring to the table. I argue that creativity exists within the limitations of 
everyday social work practice and that it is what the social worker and the clients brings to 
the interaction that helps to make the intervention creative. I provide some examples of this 
creativity in the typical crises that social workers face. I argue that having a strong ethical 
basis to their practice helps rather than hinders the social worker in being creative – it seems 
to help the social worker know, a priori, what is unacceptable practice, such as forming a 
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friendship with a client, and where the real locus of creativity is: within the limitations of the 
situation you are facing. I explore David Brandon’s (1990) advocacy of a short-lived Zen-
inspired creative social work, as well as how he was able to contribute to a change in service 
delivery for homeless people in the United Kingdom. I highlight the role of normal anxiety 
and the response to it through an exploration of Kierkegaard and Tillich, and of the courage 
to act despite our fears and worries. I also examine Sartre’s notions of worked matter and 
group-in-fusion to address the inertia and resistance of our bureaucracies to the need for 
creative change.  
Finally, I intended to look at how clients use their creativity to survive and hold onto 
hope through the story of Leon Jedwab, a survivor of more than one Nazi concentration camp 
who never gave up hope. In revisions, this story was moved to the appendices because it does 
not involve social work practice directly, but it remains an example of ways in which hope 
plays a role in daily survival in even the worst of circumstances. I also removed the details of 
an example of a creative social worker author who transgressed the ethical boundaries of 
practice; I decided not to add to his pain and suffering, so the example is talked about only in 
generalities in the final book. I was able to make the same point using an example from my 
own experience. In that case, professional boundaries were crossed that could potentially 
have undermine an agency’s access to clients in detention.  
 
Chapter 7 – Evidence-based practice and existential social work  
The existential view argues that lived experience in social work practice is the foundation 
upon which evidence-based practice (EBP), as a scientific exercise in social research, is 
practiced. Only a limited range of human experiences tend to count for the purposes of EBP. 
Much EBP is not relevant to the bulk of public welfare social work, because it assumes a 
private practice model with motivated clients who attend offices on a regular, weekly basis. 
When EBP is applied in public welfare settings, it tends to become an additional burden on 
social workers already dealing with a high degree of structure in the form of procedures, 
assessment frameworks, and highly prescribed practice methods (Munro, 2008).  
I provide an example of how existential social work, while embracing science and EBP, 
brings more to the encounter with the client. I examine some of the problems I have found in 
program evaluation using EBP, and how ignorance of these issues can distort outcomes. I 
examine two of the most famous prospective longitudinal studies ever carried out, and find 
that they have tended to reinforce an existential point of view that it is how we respond to 
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life’s challenges through our personal agency that determines our futures rather than our 
personal circumstances and histories.  
An existential viewpoint is wary of the current focus on program outcomes, because it 
is actually the main element of the program that the social worker has little control over. 
Failure is an intrinsic part of the lived experience of social welfare programs. To illustrate 
this point, I provide the example of a whole-of-government strategy that failed to achieve its 
intended overall aims. I also describe a successful pilot program that came to be legislated 
state-wide, and I highlight some of the consequences of that success, as well as what is 
missing from the story if a narrow EBP-focus is used.  
 
Chapter 8 – Conclusion  
The final chapter of the book was intended to be a comprehensive “bringing together” of all 
the elements of the existential social work approach, using the family violence field of 
service as an illustration. However, it became more a summation of what I had already 
covered in the first seven chapters of the book. I end the book with Gisela Konopka (1963) 
and her two foundational principles of practice, which I believe describe what existential 
social work practice is all about: that every client counts, and that we need to care about and 
for each other if we are going to solve the world’s problems. This latter idea is clearly 
different from the self-interested ethic of the market system, which, by definition, cannot 
meet all needs.  
 
Conclusion  
This exegesis set out to explain the theoretical, biographical and practical manner in which I 
have come to publish The Challenge of Existential Social Work Practice. I have described 
how I have come to an existential as opposed to an existentialist approach – one that is more 
open to mainstream, traditional and critical social work practice. In this approach, I have 
explored how existential ideas were explored when social casework was in its infancy, how 
the Functional school embraced the client’s creativity within the limits imposed by agencies’ 
purpose, how existentialism as a philosophy helped shape social work, and how existential 
ideas remain vital in the 21st century and can enhance social work practice.  
I have explained how I have come to the views expressed in the book through the use of 
focus groups, involvement in reading groups, discussions with other authors, and through my 
own reading of other existential social work writing. My aim has been to express some of the 
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richness of this perspective, to share some of the potential dangers or risks, and to offer ways 
to address these issues in practice.  
Ultimately, I have tried to write a text that would be useful to the direct service social 
worker operating in the large public welfare areas of practice in which most social workers 
are employed. It is here that they are faced with demand exceeding capacity, highly 
prescribed practice, and challenging situations. My goal has been to write a text in which 
these issues are faced directly, and in which a vision of how existential social work can apply 
in this environment has been set out.
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Appendix 1 Conference report 
Details of Conference  
Name of Conference:  World Congress for Existential Therapy  
Name of Organising Body: New School of Psychotherapy and Counselling 
Venue: Church House, London, United Kingdom 
Dates of Conference: 14 May 2015 to 17 May 2015 
Type of Involvement in Conference: Poster Presentation 
Nature of Presentation: Recruitment of social worker participants for focus 
groups being conducted in the second half of 2015. 
Title of Presentation: ‘Interested in Existential Social Work Practice?’ 
Achievement of planned aims and objectives  
The two objectives planned for this conference were to participate in the conference (and thus 
to be exposed to some of the key writers, therapists and practitioners in existential therapy 
internationally), and to garner the interest of the attending social workers in the four focus 
groups that I was to hold in the second half of 2015. My participation in the conference 
included observing:  
• Orah Krug’s interview with Irving Yalom (Krug is one of the regular attendees at 
Yalom’s weekly supervision sessions for senior practitioners). Irving Yalom is the most 
famous contemporary existential therapist. He has written extensively on existential 
therapy and group therapy. When the clarity of his thought was remarked upon, Yalom 
said, ‘I try very hard never to write about anything I don’t understand’. I think this was 
the most important point in the interview for me, as existential thought can be obscure, 
obtuse and generally over-complex.  
• Keynote speakers Emmy Van Deurzen, a prolific existential therapy writer and a central 
figure behind the conference, and Kirk Schneider, the current leading figure in the 
existential-humanist school of existential therapy which is dominant in the USA. Van 
Deurzen spoke on existential freedom, and Schneider on responsibility and the polarized 
mind. The conference itself had three themes: freedom, responsibility, and the meaning 
of being. Alfred Langle, a direct pupil of Viktor Frankl, and a leading figure in the 
primarily European logotherapy and existential analysis school of existential therapy, 
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gave the final keynote address, on the question of existential therapy and the meaning of 
being. Of all the therapists attending the conference, Alfred Langle seemed to me the 
most empathic, sensitive, gentle and yet powerful therapist (see also the discussion of his 
workshop, below). 
 
And attending nine two-hour workshops and symposiums, including:  
• Defining Existential Therapy with Emmy van Deurzen, Alfred Langle and US forensic 
psychologist, Stephen Diamond, who had just completed a chapter of a new academic 
book on existential therapy in Contemporary Theory and Practice in Counselling and 
Psychotherapy published by SAGE in April 2015. I spoke with Stephen after this session 
about his writing process, and I found his comments very enlightening.  
• Otto Rank: The First Existential Therapist. This workshop was particularly useful for 
me, because a discussion of Jessie Taft and the Functional school of social work (which 
was primarily influenced by Rank) comprises a chapter in my book. Will Wadlington, 
the primary leader of this session, emailed me after the conference to thank me for my 
interest, and to express his own interest in my work.  
• Love and Existence: An Existential Theory of Love. Some years ago I had read Bo 
Jacobson’s An introduction to existential psychology (2007), and since then I have 
always wanted to meet this man. His workshop was truly profound, and involved him 
asking us to share our deepest experiences of love. He then shared with us five 
theoretical assumptions or points of departure based on his phenomenological 
understanding of such love experiences.  
• Psychotherapy as Ethics: How Ethical is Existential Psychotherapy? Led by Paul 
McGinley, an existential therapist in private practice, and strongly influenced by 
Heideggerian thought, I was very keen to participate in this workshop as I have a number 
of issues concerning Heidegger’s ethics. Paul was highlighting some of the ethical 
dilemmas, such as the expectation placed on the therapist by the client “to know”, “to 
advise”, to have answers, when existential theory actually suggests that there are no 
answers. This presents an ethical dilemma for the therapist: should they be frank, or, in 
bad faith, keep their real views to themselves, for the client’s benefit? Unfortunately this 
workshop was usurped by a person who became quite abusive and condescending 
towards the other participants. He threw some money on the floor to be picked up as a 
reward by anyone who could answer the ethical questions he was posing. These 
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disruptive actions became the session. Eventually, I spoke up, calling this behaviour 
abusive and violent (for which I was later thanked by many of the participants). 
However, a couple of the participants maintained that they were not threatened by the 
behaviour, and so its dominance of the workshop continued. (The man who threw down 
the money continued to cause problems in other sessions, and his views were quite 
suspect to say the least.) Although it was disruptive, this situation did demonstrate one 
aspect of existential thought which I consider to be a limitation – the absence of a strong 
ethical basis for practice, as Levinas, who rarely gets a mention, pointed out.  
• Existentialism and the Transpersonal: What is the Connection? John Rowen led this 
workshop, and in it he gave a demonstration of his use of the subtle mind that is nurtured 
by the practice of meditation. I had read many of his books over the years, so I was keen 
to meet him (Rowan, 1997, 2005, 2010). My Master’s Thesis in social work, ‘Teaching 
Yoga in Addiction Recovery’, dealt with the transpersonal in social work, and I was 
already familiar with Ken Wilber (2010) and his views on the mind’s capacity to tap into 
higher levels of consciousness. Rowen demonstrated this capacity with great acumen 
with a volunteer, and also laid out the links of such practices to existential thought. 
• Social Existential Psychotherapy was run by Cuca Valero, and it was concerned with 
applying existential therapy “on the streets”, or to social issues, such as in poverty-
stricken communities. I found this workshop extremely inspiring, as it had a social work 
perspective that went beyond the office. There was nothing especially new in what she 
had to say, but it was inspiring to see a person living their existential ideas in real life and 
making no distinctions between environments when deciding how to practice.  
• The New Existentialists: Revisioning our being-in-the-world. This workshop was 
delivered by the developers of the website https://www.saybrook.edu/newexistentialists/, 
which is based in the USA, but really applies existential thought to current political and 
social issues around the world. I found that meeting the creators of the website really 
brought it to life for me.  
• A Life Therapy Demonstration. This workshop involved a volunteer from the audience 
engaging in a therapy session with Alfred Langle. A 65-year-old woman grieving the 
loss of her life partner volunteered to be the client for this exercise. It was very 
enlightening to see how Langle stayed with her profound sense of emptiness and 
desolation without any attempt to solve or move her on from this experience – which was 
exactly what her friends and other well-meaning people had advised her to try to do.  
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• Existentialism in Australia. This session was lead by the Centre for Existential Practice 
in Sydney. Alison Strasser and Adam Mclean are well known to me, as I have attended a 
number of their training sessions. In this context, it is important to mention that 
Strasser’s book, written with her late father, Freddie Strasser, Existential Time-Limited 
Therapy: The Wheel of Existence, is one of the most useful existential therapy books 
because it deals with the reality of most therapeutic interventions: their short duration.  
 
Academic development 
Attending this conference made me more aware of how diverse the existential therapy 
movement is and how far it has reached. For example, I had conversations with attendees 
from Brazil about the popularity of Sartre in Portuguese translation – he represents a 
significant school of thought in Brazil.  
I felt comfortable with this group of people. My skills, knowledge and experiences 
were comparable with those of the other participants, and this gave me the confidence that 
what I am writing back here in Australia is going to be valuable in the wider world of social 
work. 
 
Summary  
I also attended the inaugural meeting of an Australasian existential therapy group from the 
pacific International Federation of Psychotherapists, with representatives from many Asian 
countries.  
Attending the conference made me aware of the human flaws in some of the leading 
figures in the existential therapy movement. For example, I observed the mishandling of a 
conflict over definitions through a simple inability to use basic conflict resolution strategies 
like agreeing on process before addressing the dispute. There was also a sense of self-
aggrandizement in one of the keynote speakers who made a quite unrealistic plea for 
community-wide therapeutic interventions for all people with “polarized minds”, as if 
existential therapy could cure the world of all its problems.  
A key message from the conference was that the existential point of view that anxiety is 
a benefit not a curse to humanity is central to the existential approach to therapy. (Note that 
this is not referring to extreme forms of anxiety that can be debilitating.) Anxiety is our 
teacher. Normal anxiety is actually a help to our growth, not a hindrance. This message goes 
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back to Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety, and represents a unique perspective on this 
universal phenomenon. Rollo May, who published his PhD in book form in The Meaning of 
Anxiety, also made the same point having undertaken significant research on the subject.  
A matter left unresolved for me is ethics, which I feel is an under-developed aspect of 
existential thought. This issue became acute in the money-throwing incident, as well as when 
attendees objected to a discussion of evil or the demonic which the forensic psychologist 
Stephen Diamond brought up in referring to the work of Rollo May. Social work deals with 
harmful behaviours, and naming these is intrinsic to our psychology, but people from the 
more open therapeutic world seemed to struggle with this. This difficulty also came out in the 
silence of the movement on the revelations of the extent of Heidegger’s willingness, even 
after the Second World War had ended, to justify the holocaust using existential theory, 
arguing, for example, that the Jews have no “being” because they have no homeland. This 
argument was recently published in the Black Notebooks, which Heidegger expressed no 
reluctance to publish during his lifetime. I think it is time that the dominance of Heidegger in 
the existential field is seriously challenged.  
Overall, I was inspired by what I saw and heard. There were 1,000 people attending 
from all over the world. This represents an amazing development of 20th century existential 
thought, now being implemented as a helping tool in the 21st century. Unlike Mick Cooper, 
who expressed concern that he was not hearing anything new, I felt that the application of 
existential thought as presented at the conference would have significant implications for the 
development of existential theory in the 21st century.  
 
Resulting publications 
Obviously, my book, The Challenge of Existential Social Work Practice, to be published by 
Palgrave Macmillan in 2017, is the key outcome of my attendance at this conference. I am 
also required to complete an exegesis and the conference will feature in this publication as 
well.  
 
Value to my PhD candidature 
It is very hard not to defer to Irving Yalom, who has become a grandfather figure in the 
existential therapy movement. His amazing writing, which involves advanced storytelling 
skills, is an inspiration to me. He spoke so clearly on the basics. Without denigrating classic 
psychodynamic interpretation in resolving life’s issues, Yalom stresses the vital importance 
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of the therapeutic relationship, supported by the strong evidence he has gathered that clients 
“take what they will” from the therapeutic experience rather than what the experts think they 
will. He also backed up his view with the most evidentially sound research conducted in the 
USA, which demonstrates his point that a close, intimate, genuine relationship is the key to 
successful intervention. Again, this is not to say that interpretation is not useful, because 
Yalom emphasized that it is, only that without the other, the relationship, nothing works. 
Alfred Langle, too, put this point strongly when he said that being means “to really be there 
as a human being in relationship”. You’re really here, and then you can “find your 
responsibility”.  
Another of Yalom’s key messages was that learning and training never end in this 
business – even at well over 80, Yalom is still learning!  
I also learned that despite existential therapy’s growing popularity, it still lacks 
legitimacy in many countries, and that this could be the fate of my publication unless I 
address the things that existential thought finds difficult, like evidence-based practice. The 
potential for further schisms within the existential therapy movement is high. The attendees at 
the conference could not even agree on a basic definition of what existential therapy is, 
because of the flawed process they used. A leading existential therapist, Ernest Spinelli, was 
not invited to the conference because of previous splits within the movement, even though he 
lives in London. His books were on display for sale, but he was nowhere to be seen.  
 
Recommendation for future attendance and other relevant information  
There were many other matters of significant importance to my work. For example, Robert 
Kramer’s A Psychology of Difference, which includes most of Otto Rank’s lectures given in 
America, is the best way to understand Rank’s work according to Will Wadlington, who 
presented the workshop on Rank. I was aware of this book but now I am going to read it 
thoroughly. I had also not appreciated the influence of Nietzsche on Rank.  
I discovered, too, that Marcel was a significant influence on Bo Jacobson, as he was for 
me. Jacobson’s approach was to avoid the use of technical terms and to express things 
simply. This resonated with his audience in the workshop, and I learnt that a similar approach 
on my part would really improve my book. 
I also learned that we need to be realistic about this movement. It is a progressive 
movement with something unique to offer the world, but it is not a panacea for the world’s 
problems, as some, especially from the USA, seem to think. I remember the frustration of one 
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young woman at the conference who is studying existential therapy. She could not understand 
why people inside the movement fail to appreciate how unknown it is outside it, and that if it 
is to have any future, it must enter dialogue with the many other progressive movements in 
the world and become more outgoing and less insular. 
At the same time, I was really pleased to meet people at the conference who were using 
their existential philosophy outside the therapy room to improve social existence more 
generally, which I see as being akin to my social work agenda. These people included the 
new existentialists in America, Jacobson’s work on love, John Rowan’s on making 
connection with spirituality, the Cuca Valero’s application of social existentialism, and a 
broader feeling within the conference that it was time to engage with the world. 
Promoting interest in my focus group study 
Deakin University created a poster for me (see attached PDF) which was displayed 
throughout the conference. The Plain Language Statement and ethics approval memorandum 
from Deakin University Health were available as handouts. There did not appear to be many 
social workers attending the conference, but a few came up to me and introduced themselves. 
I had a number of discussions with a social worker and therapist from Australia and she has 
expressed interest in participating in the process. By the end of the conference, most of the 
handouts had been picked up. Whether this will result in finding participants for the research 
is difficult to tell. I have two other avenues of recruitment approved by the Ethics Committee, 
but I anticipate that most interest will be from the advertisement to the Australian Association 
of Social Workers.  
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Appendix 2 Focus group advertisement for AASW publications 
 
The AASW suggests “opportunities for research” to AASW members at 
http://www.aasw.asn.au/practitioner-resources/opportunities-for-research-participation 
Title of Research: The Challenge of Existential Social Work Practice 
 
Key dates  July–October 2015 (Monday evenings from 6–8 pm, one session per month 
– exact dates TBD)  
Participants  Social workers with an interest in and experience of applying existential 
thought in social work practice (direct service, social action and social 
policy). 
Must have at least five years post-graduate social work experience.  
About  The aim of the sessions is to obtain eight to ten vignettes that highlight the 
application of existential ideas to social work practice. The student 
researcher has a commercial contract with Palgrave Macmillan to produce 
a new book, titled The Challenge of Existential Social Work Practice. 
Vignettes highlighting existential practice issues and approaches will be 
used in the book to demonstrate the application of existential ideas in social 
work.  
Social casework developed out of the lived experience of the first social 
workers. Existential ideas have shaped social work throughout its history, 
but this has not been fully explored in previous social work texts. Existential 
ideas include freedom and responsibility, the idea that no system of thought 
can fully encompass human potential, the inevitability of choice and 
commitment in life, being fully present and available in social work for 
others, and the value of people’s lived experience as an evidence base in 
social work practice.  
The book may also contain discussion of some existential issues that social 
workers face in working with clients, such as loss of or search for meaning, 
anxiety, loss, finality and fate, and authenticity. However existential social 
work is an approach applicable to a broad range of fields of service, and it 
is not confined to dealing with existential issues.  
The aim of the book is to show how existential social work practice can 
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apply in all areas of social work practice, such as direct service, group work, 
social action and social policy.  
Most of the vignettes derived from the focus group sessions are expected to 
relate to direct practice, but fictitious vignettes that highlight the other areas 
of social work practice will also be sought. The same principles apply to all 
fields. The vignettes can be formed around the social worker’s practical 
experience, but the vignette as presented must be entirely fictitious.  
What is 
involved  
Four focus group sessions of two hours’ duration will be conducted by the 
student researcher using online technology to allow interstate and overseas 
practitioners to participate. Participants from Melbourne may prefer to meet 
the student researcher at the Burwood Campus of Deakin University at the 
specified location. They can also choose to participate online.  
Each session will begin with a 25 minute introduction from the student 
researcher on such topics as:  
• What do we mean by existential social work?  
• The history of existential thinking in social work  
• The challenges of existential social work 
• The need for case examples or vignettes  
Two anonymized vignettes will be presented and discussed per session by 
the participants.  
How to get 
involved  
Please contact the PhD student researcher, Mark Griffiths.  
Institution  
 
Deakin University, Faculty of Health, School of Health and Social 
Development, Social Work  
Principal 
Investigator 
Professor Bob Pease 
Contact and 
Student 
Investigator 
Mark Griffiths 
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